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AMERICAN LOBSTER FISHERY MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE ATLANTIC COASTAL FISHERIES
COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT ACT:




After the elections in 1994, the Republican party cited their newly
gained power over the Senate and the House of Representatives' as a call
by Americans for smaller government, deregulation, and a return of power
to the states. Political leaders from both sides of the aisle responded in
kind, albeit with varying degrees of deference to existing federal based
power. In step with this federalist mandate, in late February and early
March of 1995, President Bill Clinton announced the Regulatory Reinven-
tion Initiative, to reform the federal regulatory system.2
Fishery management has become a proving ground of this regulatory
reform and the call for return of power to the states. In 1996 the Atlantic
lobster fishery became the target of this emerging federalism. Lobster
fishery management, it is contended, is a prime example of a federal
regulatory scheme that is better suited to state management. As a result, in
late March 1996, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) an-
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. The Republican party last gained control over both the Senate and the House of
Representatives in 1946. Edmund L. Andrews, Giving Business a Chance to Test the Wings
of Deregulation, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1996 at Cl.
2. Greg Pierce, President Battles GOP Rule Freeze, Offers Own Plan to Ease
Regulation, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A6.
President Clinton ordered review of agency regulations with an eye towards
eliminating regulatory measures that are outdated or in need of reform. This review is to
consider whether the goals of a particular regulation could be achieved in "more efficient,
less intrusive ways," as well as consideratioh of whether states or local governments could
do the job. Id.
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nounced its intention to withdraw approval of the federal Fishery Manage-
ment Plan for the American Lobster Fishery (Lobster FMP) and implement-
ing regulations.3 Conservation and management of the lobster fishery,
proposed the NMFS, could be managed by the states through the Atlantic
States Marine Fishery Commission (ASMFC).4 The NMFS called upon the
ASMFC to further develop its lobster coastal management plan (CMP) and
to develop regulations under the authority of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act (ACFCMA).5
NMFS cited the President's Regulatory Reinvention Initiative as a
reason for its withdrawal6 of approval of the existing Lobster FMP.7
NMFS also determined that withdrawal of the Lobster FMP would not
compromise the identified resource management and conservation objec-
tives for the fishery.' NMFS further supported its action by asserting that
withdrawal of the Lobster FMP appeared necessary due to increasing
concerns regarding whether the FMP was consistent with Magnuson Act
national standardsf As a final reason for its action, NMFS expressed its
intention that federal management of the American lobster fishery be
consistent with state lobster management programs. 0
Despite being heralded as a shift to state management, a detailed
analysis of the management scheme provided under the ACFCMA shows
that while authority for development of the lobster plan lies with the states,
via the ASMFC, there remains a significant role for the federal government
acting through the Secretary of Commerce. In fact, withdrawal of approval
of the Lobster FMP and its implementing regulations presents opportunities
for state and federal cooperation in management of the lobster fishery. The
3. American Lobster Fishery; Removal of Regulations 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478 (1996)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 649) (proposed Mar. 27, 1996).
4. Id. at 13,478-79.
5 Id. The NMFS specifically noted that recent amendments to the ACFCMA now
provided for "state compliance to coastal management plans implemented by the ASMFC
and, therefore, is a more appropriate vehicle to support the effective implementation of these
plans." Id. at 13,479. See infra Part II.C.2, for discussion of implementation of federal
regulations under the ACFCMA.
6. American Lobster Fishery; Removal of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478.
7. The existing Lobster FMP was promulgated pursuant to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act). See infra Part HLI.B, for a complete
discussion of the Lobster FMP under the Magnuson Act.
8. American Lobster Fishery; Removal of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,478.
9. Id. at 13,479. See infra note 98 for a discussion of the Magnuson Act national
standards.
10. American Lobster Fishery; Removal of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478 (1996)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 649) (proposed Mar. 27. 1996).
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ACFCMA presents novel management opportunities by reducing con-
straints on the exercise of state jurisdiction over federal waters, as well as
by providing the NMFS with greater authority to affect state activities
within state waters. Indeed, it is this "blurring" ofjurisdictional boundaries
that has provided the opportunity at hand. The ability of ASMFC to utilize
the enhanced cooperative and jurisdictional authority of state and federal
agencies in the management of the lobster fishery may serve as a model for
future management of other fisheries. The ASMFC plan will test the
willingness of the federal government to serve merely as a conduit for state
management measures without overstepping its apparently enlarged
authority within state waters.
The states, for their part, must exercise sound judgment in the develop-
ment of an appropriate lobster management regime. Moreover, the states
must prove their ability to reach consensus on an ASMFC plan. In order
to achieve the goals of the new regulatory regime, the federal government,
acting in large part through the NMFS, must conform its regulations and
enforcement actions to the ASMFC plan while not arbitrarily exercising
such power in a fashion that violates state sovereignty. If successful, their
management approach may serve as a model for future fishery management
efforts.
The purposes of this Comment are three-fold. Part II of this Comment
will explore the legislative enactments that have provided the basis for
cooperative jurisdiction in fishery management. Part lI.A discusses how
state and federal authority as originally codified in the Magnuson Act was
sharply delineated, and how that delineation gradually gave way to the
cooperative management approach embodied in the ACFCMA. The 1996
Amendments to the Magnuson Act, while not directly implicated in the
lobster scenario, further compliment the shift towards cooperativejurisdic-
tion, as detailed in Part II.B. Part II.C will closely examine the ACFCMA,
the foundation for future lobster fishery management, from the creation of
the ASMFC to the Act's specific provisions for state and federal coopera-
tion in fishery management.
The second purpose of this Comment is to review the history of lobster
fishery management, from the roots of the Magnuson Act FMP through the
decision to withdraw it. Part III.A will outline the basic approach to fishery
management under the Magnuson Act before turning to the particulars of
the federal lobster fishery management plan under Part III.B. Part lIl.C will
discuss the ultimate failure of Amendment Five to the Lobster FMP which
was in large part the impetus for the decision to withdraw the plan, as-
detailed in Part III.D.
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The final purpose of this Comment is to raise questions concerning
potential conflicts that may arise in the transition of lobster fishery manage-
ment to the ASMFC. Part IV considers two specific obstacles that must be
overcome in order to achieve the desired level of state and federal coopera-
tion in fishery management. The effects of these obstacles will be weighed
and likely resolutions will be suggested; but most important will be the
identification of issues the resolution of which will determine the future
success of the plan.
II. LEGISLATION AND THE TRANSITION TO COOPERATIVE
FISHERY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION
The withdrawal of the Lobster FMP reflects a fundamental shift in the
federal approach to fishery management. National political and societal
forces, coupled with the failures of the regional council system imple-
mented under the Magnuson Act, led to a reassessment of the division of
state and federal authority over fishery management. Indeed, the decision
to withdraw the Lobster FMP and transition management of the fishery to
the states, via the ASMFC, was made possible due to legislative changes
in fishery management jurisdiction. Coupled with the developing trend of
returning regulatory power to the states was the enduring belief that the
lobster fishery, as with other fisheries, had to be managed in a comprehen-
sive and coordinated manner. In order to provide such management for an
entire fishery the rigid traditional federal-state jurisdictional lines needed
to be modified and loosened. The regulatory promulgation and enforce-
ment provisions of the ACFCMA represent a unique and promising
approach to cooperative jurisdiction and management methods. Recent
amendments to the Magnuson Act reflect the inclination towards state and
federal cooperation by extending greater authority to the states for fisheries
management within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
An exploration is provided below of the specific legislative enactments
that provide the legal basis for greater cooperation in fishery management.
First, the traditional concept of fishery management jurisdiction, which
predated and was ultimately codified in the Magnuson Act, will briefly be
discussed. Next, in order to identify on a broader scale the movement
towards cooperative jurisdiction, the 1996 Amendments to the Magnuson
Act will be considered. Finally, and of most relevance to the particulars of
lobster fishery management, the provisions of the ACFCMA that provide
for the implementation and enforcement of management plans for inter-
state as well as EEZ waters will be described.
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A. Traditional Fishery Jurisdiction Under the Magnuson Act
The Magnuson Act, prior to the 1996 Amendments, codified a standing
jurisdictional division between "state waters," wherein the state exercised
primary fishery management authority, and "federal waters" over which the
federal government exercised primary fishery management authority. One
of the underlying purposes of the Magnuson Act was to ensure minimum
standards" for the preservation and revitalization of identified fisheries.
In order to achieve this goal, a uniform and standardized procedural
approach to fishery management was required. Congress apparently
deemed it necessary to maintain the historically established jurisdictional
divide between state and federal waters to ensure the acceptance of such an
approach.
The Magnuson Act, as originally enacted, provided that the federal
government of the United States "will exercise ... sovereign rights and
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish, and all Continental
Shelf fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone" (i.e. federal
waters). 2 State jurisdiction, and state interaction with federal jurisdiction
is addressed in section 1856 of the Act. 3 Section 1856 essentially codified
the 1941 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Skiriotes v. Florida.4 The
implications of the Skiriotes decision were that there was to be no jurisdic-
tional overlap between the fishery regulatory activities of the federal
government and the states. The general tenor of section 1856, prior to the
1996 Amendments, 5 was to codify this proposition while preserving
modest scope for state regulations.
Section 1856, as originally enacted, provided that, "nothing in this
chapter shall be construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or
authority of any State within its boundaries."' 6 This general rule is subject
to certain exceptions listed in subsection (b), discussed in the following
paragraph. '7 Pre-Amendment section 1856 specifically delineated the
boundaries to which state jurisdiction and authority shall extend. Any
waters adjacent to a state and completely enclosed by the boundaries of the
11. See infra note 98.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1994).
13. Id. § 1856.
14. 313 U.S. 69 (1942).
15. Hereinafter reference to § 1856 as it stood prior the 1996 Amendments will be
indicated by the preface "pre-Amendment."
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(1) (1994).
17. Id.
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"territorial sea" of the United States are under the adjacent state's
authority. 8 Certain particular geographic areas are also specified in the
section. 9 Finally, there is one extra-territorial provision for state authority,
although it is negatively expressed. A state maintains regulatory authority
over any fishing vessel which is registered under the laws of that state even
when the vessel travels outside the normal state jurisdictional boundaries."
Certain exceptions were also provided to allow encroachment of
federal regulations in state waters. The exceptions may be invoked by the
Secretary of Commerce based on his findings made pursuant to appropriate
notice and hearing.2' Under certain conditions the Secretary may regulate
a fishery within the boundaries of a state, pursuant to a fishery management
plan and regulations implemented in pursuance thereof.2 The conditions
require that the regulated fishery be one which is predominately engaged
in the EEZ and beyond23 and for which a fishery management plan is
established and implemented. Second, the Secretary must determine that
the state, subject to control, has taken action or failed to take action which
will substantially and adversely affect the execution of the fishery manage-
ment plan.24 Once the Secretary has assumed control of a particular fishery
within state waters, the state must apply to the Secretary in order to regain
authority over that fishery. Once the Secretary determines that the causes
underlying the assumption of control over the fishery in state waters no
longer persist, the Secretary must cease federal regulation of the fishery
within the state's boundaries.26
Fishery jurisdiction, as originally delineated under the Magnuson Act,
consisted of rigidly drawn boundaries that did not reflect the management
related parameters of a particular fishery, but rather the historical legal
development of the boundary between federal and state authority. Gener-
ally speaking, that boundary lay on the outer edge of the territorial sea. The
most significant overlap of authority favored the federal government, and
it provided for an abrogation of state authority rather than an attempt at
18. Id. § 1856(a)(2)(A).
19. Id. § 1856(a)(2)(B), (C).
20. Id. § 1856(a)(3). Stating, in the positive, that a state may not regulate a fishing
vessel outside of its boundary if the vessel is not registered under the laws of that state. Id.
21. Id. § 1856(b)(1). Hearings must be provided in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 554
(1994).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b)(1)(B) (1994).
23. Id. § 1856(b)(1)(A).
24. Id. § 1856(b)(1)(B).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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cooperative jurisdiction. Furthermore, a state's only ability to regulate
beyond its territorial sea lay in its power to regulate fishing vessels licensed
under its laws, regardless of location. Such was the state of fishery
jurisdiction despite obvious interest and specialized knowledge of any
given state in fishery management well beyond its territorial sea, and
despite the ability of the federal government to coordinate the self-tailored
management efforts of the various states.
B. The 1996 Magnuson Act Amendments
The 1996 Magnuson Act amendments post-date the decision to
withdraw the Lobster FMP, and therefore, were in no way implicated in the
initial determination. The amendments are, nevertheless, important in
considering the underlying shift to cooperative management. It is quite
likely that passage of the ACFCMA in 1993, and the lobster fishery
situation as a whole, served as an impetus for the 1996 Magnuson Act
Amendments. This conjecture is based upon the emphasis in the 1996
amendments on federal and state cooperative fishery management. This
emphasis is particularly evident in the expanded authority of the states to
regulate fishing activities outside of the traditional state waters. On the
other hand, the 1996 Amendments have further complicated the transition
to ASMFC management of the lobster fishery by requiring the regional
councils to promulgate pro-active management measures for overfished
fisheries. This particular aspect of the 1996 Amendments is addressed at
greater length in Part N.A.
State authority to regulate fishing vessels outside the boundaries of the
state was the subject of substantial change. Section 1856(a)(3) of the
Magnuson Act, was modified significantly and now articulates in the
positive a state's authority to regulate vessels outside of its boundaries
given specific circumstances.27 The first set of circumstances requires, as
with the pre-Amendment version, that the vessel be registered under the
laws of the state.' Furthermore, one of two additional requirements must
be met: Either (1) no fishery management plan or pertinent Federal
regulations exist with regards to the fishery in which the vessel is engaging;
or, (2) the laws and/or regulations of the state must be consistent with the
federal FMP or regulations applicable to the fishery in which the vessel is
27. Id. § 1856 (a)(3).
28. Id. § 1856(a)(3)(A).
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operating. 9  The 1996 Amendments provided a second significant
expansion of potential state authority over a fishery that extends into
federal waters. States may now regulate fishing vessels outside the
boundaries of the state when the management plan, for the fishery in which
the vessel is operating, "delegates management of the fishery to a State and
the State's laws and regulations are consistent with such fishery manage-
ment plan. '30 While not specifically addressed in the provision, presum-
ably the FMP could simply delegate management authority to various states
without providing an underlying framework of a specific management plan.
No standards for measuring consistency of state laws and regulations would
exist in such a situation.31 If the Secretary determines certain state mea-
sures are inconsistent with the relevant FMP, the Secretary must notify the
state and the appropriate Council and then provide the state with the
opportunity to correct the inconsistency.32 Failure by the state to correct
such inconsistencies would result in suspension of the state's authority until
corrective measures were taken and approved by the Secretary and the
Council.33
Essential to the analysis under either section 1856(a)(3)(A) or (B), is
the concept of "consistency" of state regulations. Any state regulation
which either regulates vessels, licensed under its law, or which is an
exercise of authority delegated to the state by a federal FMP, must be
consistent with any existing FMP for the targeted fishery. Congressional
hearings shed light on the primary intent underlying this requirement and
the extent to which states may regulate consistently with existing federal
regulations. A colloquy between Senator Snowe of Maine and Senator
Stevens of Alaska, the author of the amendment, is particularly interesting
as Senator Snowe specifically mentioned Maine's efforts in the area of
lobster management. Senator Snow, after delineating several of Maine's
specific lobster regulations, questioned whether Maine's regulations, that
were more stringent than the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
federal lobster management plan, would continue to be considered "consis-
tent" with the Lobster FMP, under the intent of the amendment's author. 4
29. Id. § 1856(a)(3)(A)(i), (ii).
30. Id. § 1856(a)(3)(B).
31. Nonetheless, because the state authority would derive from a Magnuson Act FMP,
any state management measure would presumably still be required to comply with Magnuson
Act national standards.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3)(B).
33. Id.
34. 142 CONG. REc. S10,911 (1996) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
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Senator Stevens responded affirmatively, stating that his amendment would
protect "the existing authority of States to impose more stringent regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with a management plan on its vessel in the
Federal zone."'3 Senator Stevens continued by noting that more stringent
state regulations which were considered to be consistent prior to the
amendment would continue to be considered consistent.36 Thus, a state
may, consistent with the Congressional intent underlying the amendment,
impose more stringent regulations over federal waters pursuant to authority
vested by the amendment than are imposed by the federal regulations.
These two changes to state jurisdiction under the Maguuson Act reflect
the underlying movement towards cooperative federal-state jurisdiction.
Indeed, they evidence support for a return of fishery management authority
to the states as exemplified by the lobster fishery scenario. The amended
Act, however, provides for such delegation to the state to be executed
within the parameters of the Magnuson Act. A federal FMP can delegate
management authority to a state, but require certain minimum standards by
providing for them within the framework of the FMR In this manner the
federal government may provide goals and guidelines for management of
a particular fishery while leaving the specific methods to state and even
local determination. An interesting question is whether this approach
would have been an effective alternative for lobster fishery management
rather than withdrawal of the FMP in favor of ASMFC management.
C. Cooperative Management Under
The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act
The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act37 is the
central piece of legislation underlying the future management of the
American Lobster fishery. Under the ACFCMA the pertinent states are
empowered to manage a given fishery resource via the Atlantic States
Marine Fishery Commission. Because the ACFCMA predates the 1996
amendments to the Magnuson Act, at the time of the decision to withdraw
the Lobster FMP the ACFCMA provided the only legislative basis for a
shift of management authority to those states active in the lobster fishery.
Indeed, the ACFCMA is rather unique in its approach to fishery jurisdiction
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5108 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
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and its provisions for cooperative management, not only between the
several states but also between the states and the federal government.
1. The Atlantic States Marine Fishery Commission
The ASMFC was created in 1942 by an interstate compact (Compact),
with the consent of Congress, between nine Atlantic coast states: Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.38 Congressional consent to the Com-
pact was originally limited to fifteen years.3 9 Article II of the Act granting
consent to the Compact provided that any state contiguous to the member
states and "riparian upon waters frequented by anadromous fish, flowing
into waters under the jurisdiction of any of the aforementioned states" was
allowed to become a member of the ASMFC.4° In accordance with this
provision the states of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, as well as the District of Columbia entered into
the compact at a later date.4' In granting consent to the addition of these
states to the Compact, Congress also repealed the fifteen year time limit on
the Compact, allowing for indefinite life.42
The purpose of the Compact is to promote "better utilization" of the
marine, shell, and anadromous fisheries of the Atlantic seaboard by joint
development of fishery protection plans.43 The Compact does not authorize
the signatory states to limit the production of fish or fish products in order
to fix prices or perpetuate a monopoly in the fishing industry." The
ASMFC consists of three representatives of each member state: (1) The
executive officer of the state administrative agency in charge of fishery
conservation; (2) A member of the state legislature designated by the
Commission or Committee on Interstate Cooperation of the state; (3) A
38. An Act Granting the Approval and Consent to an Interstate Compact Relating to
the Better Utilization of the Fisheries (marine, shell and anadromous) of the Atlantic
Seaboard and Creating the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, Pub. L. No. 77-
539, 56 Stat. 267 (1942). [hereinafter "Interstate Compact Consent Act"].
39. Id.
40. Id. at art. II.
41. See An Act Granting the Consent and Approval of Congress to an Amendment to
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact and Repealing the Limitation of the Life of
such Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-721, Pub. L. No. 81-721, 64 Stat. 467 (1950).
42. Id. at Amendment 1, § 3.
43. Interstate Compact Consent Act, supra note 38, art. I, 56 Stat. 267.
44. Id.
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citizen of the state who has knowledge and interest in the "marine fisheries
problem" as appointed by the Governor of the state.4"
Article V of the Act granting consent to the compact provided a
specific internal structure for the commission and for actions to be taken by
the ASMFC. A chairman and vice-chairman are elected by the Commis-
sion, and other officials and employees may be appointed and discharged
as necessary to carry out the purposes of the compact.' The ASMFC is
empowered to found offices to carry out its business and may meet at any
time or place, but is required to meet at least once a year.47 In order for any
general action to be taken by the ASMFC it must be approved by affirma-
tive vote by a majority of the states present at a given meeting and action
in regards to any fishery must be approved by a majority vote of those
states which have an interest in the relevant species.4"
Under the Interstate Compact Consent Act, the ASMFC's role was
completely advisory. The Commission's power was limited to making
recommendations in order to coordinate the preservation efforts of the
individual states in their exercise of police power over state waters.49 State
police power under the Tenth Amendment is the traditional basis for fishery
conservation and management measures in state waters.50 Any attempts by
a state to extend its fishery regulatory jurisdiction beyond its state waters
were subjected to a two prong test.5 ' The state must first show that it had
a "legitimate interest" in regulating "high sea fisheries" and second, it had
to demonstrate a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction over the fisher-
men. 2 Advisory opinions of the Compact were intended to unify state
approaches to fishery management and to assert common interests in both
state and federal waters fisheries. Lacking any direct regulatory authority,
however, the ASMFC's recommendations had limited influence upon
45. See id. art. III. If a person cannot be identified under either of the first two
categories, such a person shall be appointed by the Governor of the state. Id.
46. See id. art. V, at 268.
47. Id.
48. Interstate Compact Consent Act, supra note 38, art. IV, 56 Stat. at 268.
49. l,
50. Eldon V.C. Greenberg & Michael E. Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery
Conservation Zone. A New Rolefor the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 649 (1982). See, e.g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
51. Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 50, at 650.
52. Id.
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fishery conservation and management. The ACFCMA 3 was designed to
eliminate the impotence of the ASMFC.
2. Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act
The ACFCMA, 4 enacted in 1993, dramatically changed the nature and
authority of the ASMFC. Congressional findings cited in the ACFCMA
reflect Capitol Hill's perception not only of the current state of Atlantic
coastal fisheries management, but also the political climate of 1993.
Among the findings was that the absence of management authority in one
central government entity had lead to "disparate, inconsistent, and intermit-
tent State and Federal regulation[s]" over Atlantic coastal fishery
resources.5 The findings also state that the responsibility for Atlantic
coastal fishery management should reside with the states, and that states
should discharge their responsibilities and cooperative efforts of fishery
management via the ASMFC 6 Congress concluded with the ominous yet
accurate assertion that Atlantic State fishery resource conservation and
management is in the national interest.
The stated purpose of the ACFCMA is to support and encourage
interstate conservation and management of Atlantic coastal fishery re-
sources through development, implementation, and enforcement of coastal
fishery management plans. 8 A coastal fishery management plan (CMP),
the equivalent of a Magnuson Act FMP, is the ACFCMA's term for an
ASMFC plan for the management of a coastal fishery resource. 9 The
ACFCMA explicitly addresses the issue of Federal and state cooperation
in Atlantic coast fishery management. Specifically, the Act provides for
the development of federal regulations by the Secretary of Commerce to
support Commission management efforts.6°
The ACFCMA specifically anticipates the dual presence of a
Magnuson Act FMP and a ACFCMA management scheme with regards to
53. 16 U.S.C. § 5101-5108 (1994).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 5101(a)(3).
56. Id. § 5101(a)(4).
57. Id. § 5101(a)(6).
58. Id. § 5101(b).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 5102(1) (1994).
60. Id. § 5103(a). The section continues by stating that such programs are to include
"activities to support and enhance State cooperation in the collection, management, and
analysis of fishery data; law enforcement; habitat conservation; fishery research, including
biological and socioeconomic research; and fishery management planning." Id.
1999] American Lobster Fishery Management Under ACFCMA 125
the waters of the EEZ. It is the hierarchical relation of these two poten-
tially conflicting management vehicles that serves to explain the NMFS's
decision to withdraw the Lobster FMP. The power of the NMFS to
implement federal EEZ regulations complimentary to an ACFCMA
management plan is contingent upon the absence of a Magnuson Act FMP
for the targeted fishery.6 Furthermore, any such regulations may only be
implemented after consultation with the appropriate regional fishery
council,62 in this case the New England Fishery Management Council
(NEFMC), and all regulations must be consistent with the Magnuson Act
national standards.63 The ACFCMA provides that should FMP and CMP
regulations co-exist for the same fishery, regulations issued pursuant to the
Magnuson Act shall supersede ACFCMA regulations.'" The trumping of
an ACFCMA management plan by a Magnuson Act FMP makes clear the
need to withdraw the Lobster FMP in order to provide management
authority to the Commission.
The political and legislative forces driving the decision by NMFS to
withdraw the Lobster FMP were complex. These forces most likely
included the well documented failures of the regional fishery management
process.65 The nation's political climate, however, should not be over-
looked. An emerging federalism grew out of a popular call to the federal
government to look to state and local bodies for solutions to regionalized
problems and to empower those bodies to enact such solutions. Fishery
management was included in this movement. In order to empower states
with the ability to exercise fishery management not only within their
territorial seas but also within the EEZ, traditional rules of federal-state
jurisdiction needed to be reworked. Furthermore, to allow the federal
government to assure regulatory compliance, not only in federal waters but
also in state waters, fishery management jurisdictional boundaries needed
to be modified.
61. Id. § 5103(b)(1).
62. Id. § 5103(b)(1). See discussion supra Part II .C.3 and accompanying notes,
which explores the substantive provisions of the ACFCMA in greater detail.
63. Id. § 5103(b)(1)(B). See infra note 98.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Peter Shelley, et a., The New England Fisheries Crisis: What Have We
Learned? 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.. 221 (1996) (in particular Section IV.C.& D); Teresa M.
Cloutier, Comment, Conflicts of Interest on Regional Fishery Management Councils:
Corruption or Cooperative Management, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 101 (1996).
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3. Cooperative Jurisdiction Under the ACFCMA
The ACFCMA is a unique legislative enactment in that it specifically
anticipates and provides for cooperative management efforts between the
ASMFC states and the federal government in Atlantic coastal fishery
management.' The Act takes two significant steps beyond mere federal
recognition of interstate cooperative efforts at fishery management. First,
and more significant in terms of the concept of overlapping jurisdiction, it
provides a vehicle for the promulgation of complementary regulations over
federal waters.67 Second, the Act provides for federal enforcement mea-
sures to ensure compliance with coastal fishery management plans devel-
oped by the ASMFC.68 Both of these aspects are important indicators of
the shift toward cooperative fishery management jurisdiction. The disci-
plined utilization of both provisions will be necessary to ensure effective
management of the American lobster fishery, and to demonstrate the
appropriateness of this management model for other fisheries.
Section 5103 of the ACFCMA is the centerpiece of the Act's coopera-
tive management scheme, indeed the section's title indicates as much:
"State-Federal cooperation in Atlantic coastal fishery management." 69 The
provision begins by requiring the Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction
with the Secretary of the Interior, to develop and implement a program that
will support the interstate management efforts of the ASMFC.70 Specifi-
cally, the program is required to "support and enhance State cooperation in
collection, management, and analysis of fishery data; law enforcement;
habitat conservation; fishery research, including biological and socioeco-
nomic research; and fishery management planning."
'
The ability to promulgate regulations in support of ASMFC manage-
ment plans is granted in section 5103(b). A important caveat begins this
section; the Secretary of Commerce may implement such complementary
regulations in the absence of an "approved and implemented" Magnuson
Act FMP.7" It is this requirement that precipitated the need to withdraw the
Lobster FMP in order to effectively pass management authority to the
ASMFC. Additionally, the Secretary must consult with the regional
66. 16 U.S.C. § 5103 (1994).
67. See id. § 5103(b).
68. See id. §§ 5104(b), (c), 5105.
69. Id. § 5103.
70. Id. § 5103(a).
71. Id.
72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5103(b) (1994).
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council prior to implementation of such regulations.73 Finally, any regula-
tions implemented to effectuate the ASMFC plan within federal waters
must meet two additional requirements. One, the regulations must be
"compatible with the effective implementation" of the Commission plan;
and two, all regulations must be consistent with the Magnuson Act national
standards.74 Section 5103 continues to note that the federal regulations may
include provisions recommended by the ASMFC, which in practice seem
likely to be the primary basis for the regulations.75 If regulations imple-
mented pursuant to a Magnuson Act/ Council FMP and regulations issued
under the ACFCMA should come into conflict, the FMP regulations
supersede those issued under the ACFCMA.76 Enforcement of regulations
issued pursuant to this section is assured by incorporation of the Magnuson
Act enforcement provisions.77 While a reading of section 5103 implies a
continuing deference to particular aspects to the Magnuson Act, the
underlying intent indicates a bold move towards greater state participation
and authority in fishery management. Removal of Council based manage-
ment plans provides the opportunity for state formulated plans via the
ASMFC. As noted above, the decision by NMFS to withdraw the Lobster
FMP, contingent upon development by the ASMFC of its own lobster
management plans, was an integral part of the shift to greater state control
over the lobster fishery. For the first time the states have a
quasi-independent vehicle to exert broad jurisdictional authority over
fisheries in federal waters, through development of ASMFC management
plans and issuance of federal regulatory recommendations to the Secretary
of Commerce. The posture with which the Lobster FMP was withdrawn,
contingent upon development of an ASMFC CMP, intimates that, so long
as the ASMFC successfully formulates a management plan, the transforma-
tion from recommendation to regulation will be but a formality.
73. While there are no specifications as to what "consultation" with the Council must
entail, it is presumably something short of the complicated and burdensome approval
necessary for council action with regard to one of its own FMP's.
74. 16 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(1)(A), (B) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998). This language,
amended from "necessary to support" to "compatible with" seems to afford the Secretary
greater discretion. See infra note 98 for summary of national standards.
75. Id. § 5103(b) (1996).
76. Id. This provision appears redundant in light of the apparent requirement that
there exist no Council developed FMP.
77. Id. § 5103(b)(2). This clause specifically refers to Magnuson Act sections which
delineate prohibited acts, civil penalties, criminal offenses, civil forfeitures, and enforcement
measures. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1861 (1994).
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The second significant jurisdictional aspect of the ACFCMA relates to
enforcement of Commission fishery management plans once developed and
implemented. The ACFCMA specifically provided for and was intended to
encourage the development of management plans, not only for the state
waters of the various ASMFC states, but also for federal waters.78 This
approach appropriately seeks to manage a particular fishery as a complete
entity, rather than as divided among a series of fishery jurisdictions
delineated by historical legal boundaries. These jurisdictional boundaries,
however, have provided the basis of authority for enforcing the imple-
mented regulatory measures. It is fairly accurate to say that prior to
AFCMA each state maintained responsibility for fishery management
within its territorial sea, while the federal government enforced fishery
regulation within federal waters. Attempts to reach cooperative agreements
on uniform management approaches, in particular between multiple states,
faced the insurmountable problem that any one state could not effectively
enforce provisions of a cooperative plan.
Recognizing this flaw of traditional inter-state agreements, Congress
provided specific enforcement provisions within ACFCMA. Each of the
ACFCMA states are required to implement and enforce the provision of
any CMP within the plan's specified time period.79 The Act contains a
reach-back provision that requires the Commission to establish time-
frames for state implementation of CMPs in existence prior to enactment
of the ACFCMA.8° Once implemented, the ASMFC must review at least
annually each states' implementation and enforcement of the CMP to
determine whether every state is in compliance." The results of the
compliance reviews are to be submitted to the Secretaries of Commerce and
Interior.82
In the event of non-compliance with a plan's provisions by one of the
ASMFC states, the federal authority is then invoked to assure adequate
measures are taken to reach compliance, and if necessary, to exact punitive
measures on the non-complying state. If it finds that a state has failed to
enact, implement, and enforce laws or regulations as required to conform
with the provisions of the FMP, the Commission "shall" determine that the
state is not in compliance. 83 Upon such a determination the Commission
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 5103(a), (b) (1994).
79. Id. § 5104(b)(1).
80. Id. § 5104(b)(2).
81. Id. § 5104(c).
82. Id.
83. Id. §§ 5105(a) 4102(10).
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must notify the Secretaries of Commerce and Interior of such conclusion
within ten working days.'
The Secretary of Commerce, upon receiving notice of a state's
non-compliance, is then required to take certain steps to compel state
compliance. Within thirty days after receiving the notification from the
Commission, the Secretary must review the determination of
non-compliance, and then must independently reach a conclusion as to
whether the state has failed to implement the particular management plan.85
The Secretary must also determine whether the specific measures that the
state has failed to implement are "necessary for the conservation of the
fishery in question." 6 In reaching his findings, the Secretary of Commerce
must consider the comments offered by the non-complying state as well as
provide the state with the opportunity to meet with the Secretary concern-
ing its comments.' Additionally, the Secretary may seek and consider not
only the comments of the Commission, but also those of the Regional
Council.8
II. LOBSTER MANAGEMENT UNDER THE MAGNUSON ACT FMP
AND THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE LOBSTER FMP
In order to understand the transition of lobster fishery management
authority, it is important to review the history of lobster fishery manage-
ment. Part lIH.A sets forth the basic elements of a fishery management plan
under the Magnuson Act. Part 1II.B explores the particular historical facts
behind the promulgation of the Magnuson Act lobster management plan.
Next, Part II.C tells the story of the Amendment Five debacle that ulti-
mately sounded the death knell of the Lobster FMP. Finally, the decision
process behind the withdrawal of the Lobster FMP is presented in Part
III.D.
A. Fishery Management Plans Under the Magnuson Act
The failure of the Lobster FMP was in large part due to the failures of
84. Id. § 5105(b). The notification shall include the reasons underlying the
determination and "an explicit list of actions" the non-complying state must take in order to
comply with the plan. The offending state is also to receive the notice. Id.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (1994).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 5106(b).
88. Id.
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the Regional Fishery Management Council process, thus the first step to
understanding these failures is by establishing the procedures.
1. Magnuson Act Fishery Management Generally
Two general purposes were encompassed in the Magnuson Act,89 the
first, and of most significance to this Comment, was to extend United States
jurisdiction of marine fishery regulation out to 200 nautical miles from the
coast, the exclusive economic zone.9' Secondly, the Act sought to control
foreign access to resources in this zone.9 Implicit in the decision to vest
the federal government with control over fishery management in the EEZ
was a significant reduction in the role of the states in coastal fishery
management.92 This shift in fishery management authority immediately
implicated issues of federalism.93
The Magnuson Act vests the Secretary of Commerce with general
authority over the implementation of the Act. The Secretary acts through
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and its
subsidiary the NMFS. 4 Conservation and management measures for any
particular fishery are generally entrusted to eight Regional Management
councils subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce.95 Councils
89. The Magnuson Act was enacted in 1976 as the Fishery Management and
Conservation Act. In 1980, the late Senator Warren G. Magnuson's (WA) name was added
to the law, he was the original sponsor of the law in the Senate. Catherine E. Decker, Issues
in the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 1
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 323, n.1 (1995). See Pub. L. No. 96-561, § 238, 94 Stat. 3300
(amending 16 U.S.C. § 1801).
The Magnuson Act dramatically changed the federal-state relationship with regards to
fishery management. See generally, Greenberg, supra note 49. The Act extended United
States fishery management jurisdiction to 200 miles offshore (now known as the exclusive
economic zone. Decker at 323.
90. Decker, supra note 89, at 327.
91. Id.
92. Ms. Decker notes four other significant changes in fishery management as a result
of the Magnuson Act in addition to the reduced role of the states. Id. at 329-30. They are,
significant control over foreign fishing, the introduction of the concept of "Optimum Yield,"
exception of highly migratory species from scope of the Act, and the establishment of the
regional councils. Id. at 330-34.
93. For discussion of the initial issues of federalism raised by enactment of the
Magnuson Act, and the subsequent emergence of federalism in the field of fishery
management, see Greenberg, supra note 49.
94. Robert J. McManus, America's Saltwater Fisheries: So Few Fish, So Many
Fishermen, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 13, 14 (1995).
95. Id. at 14. McManus notes that while the Act dictates that the councils include
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are required to develop an FMP for every fishery in their region "that
requires conservation and management."96 Essentially, the Magnuson Act
creates a two-tiered decision making mechanism that calls on the regional
councils to develop management strategies consistent with the Act while
requiring the Secretary of Commerce to review FMP's and implement
necessary regulations. 7 The Magnuson Act requires that every FMP
developed must comply with seven "national standards."98 These standards
several federal and state fisheries officials, the majority of council members are appointed
by the Secretary of Commerce who selects from lists provided by governors of the states
comprising the region. Id. The Magnuson Act provides the broad requirement that council
members be "knowledgeable" about fisheries management. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1852(b)(2)(A)).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h) (1994).
97. William R. Rogalski, The Unique Federalism of the Regional Councils Under the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 163,
169-170 (1980-81).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1994). The "National Standards" can be summarized as
follows:
1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
continually achieving optimum yield from each fishery,
2) Conservation and management measures shall be based on the best scientific
information available.
3) An individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit, and interrelated stocks
of fish managed in close coordination, to the extent practicable.
4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between
residents of different states. If allocation of fishing rights is necessary it must
be "(A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to
promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular
individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges."
5) Conservation and management measures shall promote efficient use of
fishery resources where practicable except that no measure may be solely based
on economic allocation.
6) Variations among and contingencies in various fisheries, fishery resources,
and catches shall be considered in conservation and management measures.
7) Conservation and management measures shall minimize costs and avoid
unnecessary duplication to the extent possible.
Id.
These standards had a significant impact on the underlying rationale for withdrawal
of the Lobster FMP and will remain important in the analysis of the appropriateness and
potential effectiveness of lobster management under the ACFCMA. Additionally, three
more standards were added with the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996:
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conserva-
tion requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and
rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery
resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained
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promote uniformity and consistency in fishery management.
2. Fishery Managment Plan Implementation Process
The identification by a regional council of a fishery in need of
conservation and management sets in motion a complex set of procedural
steps for the development of an FMP. Public hearings must be conducted
"at appropriate times and in appropriate locations in the geographical area
concerned" so as to allow for comment by interested parties on the develop-
ment of the FMP.99 Once developed, the FMP is submitted to the Secre-
tary of Commerce for review. "0 Additionally, the council must submit on
a continual basis any periodic reports it finds appropriate as well as any
requested by the Secretary of Commerce.'' In addition to the FMP, the
council must also submit proposed regulations necessary or appropriate to
the implementation of the FMP.02
The process of review and implementation begins upon receipt of the
FMP by the Secretary. The Secretary first must perform an initial evalua-
tion of the plan to determine whether it is consistent with the national
standards and is of sufficient substance to warrant review. 0 3 An FMP that
satisfies this initial evaluation is then subject to a more detailed review to
ensure compliance not only with the Magnuson Act national standards, but
also with other provisions of the Act and any other applicable law."° The
Secretary of Commerce is further required to publish a notice in the Federal
Register concerning the management plan and requesting comments and
participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize
adverse economic impact on such communities.
9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A)
minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the
mortality of such bycatch.
10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable,
promote the safety of human life at sea.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(8), (9), (10) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
99. Id. § 1852(h)(3). To complicate matters the "geographical area concerned" may
include areas subject to the authority of another council if the concerned fishery is migratory.
Before conducting hearings in an area covered by another council, that other council must
be consulted. Id.
100. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
101. Id. § 1852(h)(4).
102. Id. § 1853(c). Proposed regulations are then subject to action by the Secretary
under §§ 1854 and 1855 of the Act. Id.
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(A) (1994).
104. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(B).
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pertinent data for a sixty-day period beginning upon the receipt of the
proposed FMP.'0 Within fifteen days of the receipt of the plan from the
regional council the Secretary must make any necessary changes to the
FMP and then publish in the Federal Register the proposed regulations for
the implementation of the management plan.'06
Action is required by the Secretary of Commerce on any FMP that the
submitting council characterizes as final."° Failure by the Secretary to
notify the submitting council of disapproval of part or all of the plan within
sixty days, or notice from the Secretary that the FMP is not disapproved,
results in the FMP going into effect."' 8 A determination by the Secretary
that the submitted plan is not in conformance with applicable law requires
that the Secretary notify the council of his intent to disapprove all or part
of the plan. 9 The council may then submit a revised plan or amendment
to the proposed plan in order to bring it into conformance.1 Submission
of a new plan by the council reinitiates the process of Secretarial review."'
In specific situations the Secretary of Commerce is empowered by the
Magnuson Act to prepare and implement FMPs for identified fisheries.
The Secretary is authorized to develop an FMP with respect to any fishery
only if the appropriate council fails to develop and submit a plan and such
fishery requires conservation and management; or, if after disapproval of
an FMP the council fails to submit a revised plan." 2 Additionally, the
Secretary may, upon finding that "an emergency exists involving any
fishery, ... promulgate emergency regulations necessary to address the
emergency."". An FMP developed by the Secretary must be submitted to
105. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(C). The Act requires that the Secretary "take into account" the
comments and data received from "interested persons." Id. at § 1854(a)(2)(a).
106. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(A).
107. Id. § 1854(a)(3)(A).
108. Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A), (B).
109. 1&. § 1854(b)(2). The written notice must specify the law with which the plan
is inconsistent, the nature of the inconsistency, and recommendations of steps that could be
taken by the council to bring the plan into conformance with the applicable law. Id. §
1854(b)(2)(A-C).
110. Id § 1854(b)(3). A revised plan must be accompanied by modified proposed
regulations to implement the plan as well. Id.
111. Id. § 1854(b)(3)(B), (C). This process of council plan development, secretarial
review and disapproval, and council revision and amendment may repeat itself ad infinitum.
Id § 1854(b)(3)(C)(ii).
112. Id. § 1854(c)(1)(A), (B). See Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc.
v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1993) (challenge to Secretarial agreement to consent
decree regarding FMP for New England fishery).
113. Id. § 1855(c). See Parravano v. Babbitt, 837 F. Supp. 1034, 1041 (N.D. Cal.
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the appropriate regional council for comments, and both a Secretarial FMP
or emergency regulations must be in compliance with the Act's national
standards." 4
3. Fishery Management Plan Policy
The Magnuson Act expresses the distinct purpose of conserving and
managing fishery resources found off the United States Coast."5 The Act
serves as a mandate in that "the United States claims, and will exercise in
the manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign rights and exclusive
fishery management authority over all fish, and all Continental Shelf
fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone."6 Congress' use of
compulsory language requiring exclusive federal management over the EEZ
imposes a requirement upon on the Secretary of Commerce. Indeed, the
obligation of the federal government to manage federal water fisheries has
been affirmed by the (now defunct) House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries."7
Fishery Management Plans developed either by a regional council or
the Secretary of Commerce" 8 pursuant to the Magnuson Act are required
to contain certain provisions." Management and conservation measures
included in the FMP must be "necessary and appropriate for the conserva-
tion and management of the fishery, to prevent overfishing, and to protect,
restore, and promote the long-term health and stability of the fishery." 2 '
Additionally, as noted previously, every FMP must meet the seven national
standards, as well as provide a description of the fishery. The FMP must
1993) (challenge to Secretary's energency regulation reducing Klamath chinook ocean
harvest rate); Trawler Diane Marie, Inc. v. Brown, 918 F. Supp. 921, 925 (E.D. N.C. 1995)
(challenge to Secretary's emergency rule temporarily closing scallop fishery in federal
waters of the coast of Alaska).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(2)(A), (B) (1994). See also Parravano v. Babbitt, 837 F.
Supp. at 1044-45.
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (1994).
116. Id. § 1811(a) (emphasis added).
117. H.R. REP. No. 97-438 at 6 (1982).
118. Under the Magnuson Act, the Secretary of Commerce is empowered to prepare
a fishery management plan, subject to the national standards, in the following situations: (1)
The appropriate regional council fails to develop and submit to the Secretary a FMP for a
fishery in need of conservation and management, 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1)(A); or, (2) the
Secretary disapproves of a submitted plan and the appropriate council fails to submit a
revised plan or amendment. Id. § 1854(c)(1)(B).
119. Id. § 1853(a).
120. Id. § 1853(a)(1)(A).
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assess and specify the present and likely future condition of the maximum
sustainable yield and optimum yield"' from the fishery." Fishery
management plans must also "assess and specify" various technical aspects
concerning the capacities of the fishing fleets harvesting the managed
species.'23
The Magnuson Act specifically provides certain provisions that may
be utilized in a management plan at the discretion of the developing council
or Secretary of Commerce. 24 An FMP may require that fishing vessels,
vessel operators, or any United States fish processor obtain a permit or pay
fees to the Secretary to engage in harvesting or processing of the managed
species.' 5 Management plans may establish fishing zones and periods in
which fishing activities shall be restricted or forbidden, or require that only
certain types of vessels or gear be used.126 FMIPs may designate catch
limitations which are "necessary and appropriate for the conservation and
management of the fishery."'2 7 Systems to limit access to the protected
fishery may also be developed subject to certain consideration." A plan
may also make certain provisions for the collection of data relevant to the
management and conservation of the fishery, including requiring that
observers be allowed on fishing vessels. 129 Finally, and what might have
constituted a relevant option for allowing greater state input to the federal
Lobster FMP, federal fishery management plans may incorporate relevant
conservation and management measures of coastal states nearest to the
fishery, so long as such measures are consistent with the national
standards. 3 °
121. Id. § 1853(a)(3). Optimum yield is defined as the amount of fish "which will
provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food
production and recredational activities" and "which is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social,
or ecological factor." Id. § 1802(2 1).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)-(4) (1994).
123. Id. § 1853(a)(4). See id. § 1853(a)(5)-(8) foradditional requirements of fishery
management plans.
124. Id. § 1853(b).
125. la § 1853(b)(1)(A)-(C). Such fees or permits are applicable to fishing in federal
waters or processing of fish subject to a FMP taken from federal waters. I&.
126. IdR § 1853(b)(2), (4).
127. Id. § 1853(b)(3). Various factors are listed as possible bases for catch
limitations, including: area, species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental, catch and total
biomass. Id.
128. Id. § 1853(b)(6).
129. Id. § 1853(b)(8). See also §1853(b)(7), (9).
130. Id. § 1853(b)(5).
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B. Federal Lobster Fishery Management Plan
The Lobster FMP was prepared by the New England Fishery Manage-
ment Council (NEFMC) and approved and implemented in 1983.13' The
NEFMC represents the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut and exercises authority over "fisheries in the
Atlantic Ocean seaward of such States."' 32 The American lobster fishery
is pursued primarily in Atlantic waters off the coasts of the states from
Maine to Virginia. 133 Lobster management measures for state waters, out
to three miles from the coast, are enacted by the several states."3 The
federal Lobster FMP was developed to support state management efforts
and to provide for coordinated management of the American lobster fishery
across its geographical range.135 In fact, regulations implementing the
Lobster FMP defer to existing state management measures by specifically
providing that no federal regulation would supersede a more restrictive
state measure.1
36
Following is a survey of three major targets of regulation in the federal
FMP. The measures cited are indicative of management and conservation
techniques, but by no means are exhaustive of the full range of measures
implemented under the Lobster FMP. Indeed, the Lobster FMP regulations
represented a broad array of management and conservation practices. 1
37
The first category of management measures addressed the "lobsterer" and
his or her vessel. One of the primary control mechanisms instituted by the
lobster management regulations was a vessel permitting scheme.3 ' Lobster
131. American LobsterFishery; Removal of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478(1996)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 649) (proposed Mar. 27, 1996).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1) (1994). The council is comprised of 17 voting members,
11 of whom are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, at least one from each state. Id.
133. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW: WITHDRAWAL OF SECRETARIAL APPROVAL OF THE FISHERY




136. 50 C.F.R. § 649.3 (1996).
137. Many of the regulations noted are the result of Amendment Five to the Lobster
FMP implemented on July 20, 1994. See infra III.C and accompanying notes for a more
detailed discussion of Amendment Five.
138. 50 C.F.R. § 649.4 (1996). The present permitting scheme provided for
implementation of a limited access system phased in over three distinct periods. (1) 1994
vessel permits, (2) permitting for 1995, and (3) vessel permit eligibility for 1996 and beyond.
Id. § 649.4(a), (b).
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FMP regulations further required that any "operator of a vessel of the
United States that fishes for, possesses, land American lobsters, in or
harvested from the EEZ." must obtain an "operator's permit" as of January
1, 1995."39 Permitting requirements provided indirect controls on the
lobster fishery by extending to lobster dealers as well."4
A second area of regulations in the Lobster FMP related to specific
prohibitions in the practice of lobster fishing. Prohibitions included' the
retention of a lobster that fails to meet the minimum carapace length set
forth elsewhere in the regulations, 42 maintaining possession of any berried
female lobster,43 and retention of any "V-notched" female lobster.' Any
violation of the permit requirements noted in the previous paragraph were
also deemed unlawful. 45 Interestingly, though perhaps not surprisingly,
lobster FMP regulations sought to protect management and conservation
officials by making it illegal to "assault, resist, oppose, harass, intimidate,
or interfere with" any NMFS approved observer in the exercise of a
"search, inspection, investigation, or seizure" pursuant to the plan's
regulations.'" Requirements for harvesting and landing of lobster were
more specifically delineated in a different portion of the regulations. In
addition to specifying carapace length, section 649.20 addressed lobster
mutilation, berried female lobsters, and the forbidden practice of "scrub-
bing," used to remove eggs from berried females. 47
The third major focus of regulations in the Lobster FMP related to
lobstering gear. Implementing regulations specify particular criteria for the
identification of gear used in the harvesting of lobsters. All lobstering gear
used in the EEZ that was not permanently attached to a vessel was required
to be "legibly and indelibly" marked by either a number assigned by the
139. Id. at § 649.5. The regulation exempts parties or boats in possession of six or
fewer lobsters per person not intended for sales. Id. § 649.5(a). Notably, the regulation also
does not apply to operators of vessels that fish exclusively in state waters. Id.
140. Id. at § 649.6
141. Id. at § 649.8. See id. for complete coverage of illegal practices.
142. Id. at § 649.8(a)(1). The minimum length is currently 3.25 inches long. Id. §
649.20(b).
143. Id. at § 649.8(a)(3). In order to discourage attempts to escape this prohibition,
the regulations also make it unlawful to remove the eggs from any berried lobster, and even
prohibit the landing or possession of a lobster by any person that has come in contact with
substances used to remove lobster eggs. Id. § 649.8(a)(4).
144. Id. § 649.8(a)(5).
145. Id. § 649.8(b).
146. Id. § 649.8(c)(6).
147. Id. § 649.20(b)-(e).
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regional director, and/or any identification marking required by the vessel's
port state.'48 Lobster pot trawls consisting of three or fewer pots were
required to be marked with a single buoy.'49 Trawls consisting of more
than three posts were required to have a radar reflector and a single flag
attached to the western-most end of the trawl, while the eastern-most end
needed only the radar reflector. 50
Trawl lines were limited to one and one half nautical miles in length.'5 '
Lobster FMP regulations further demanded that every lobster trap deployed
in the EEZ be built with "escape vents in the parlor section of the trap." '52
Traps that were not properly identified or constructed were subject to
seizure and disposal. 15
3
C. The Amendment Five Debacle
1. The Impetus for Amendment Five
Essential to understanding the decision to move away from Magnuson
Act federal lobster fishery management is a review of the failed attempt to
revamp the Lobster FMP with Amendment Five. This Amendment would
have been a significant alteration of the lobster management plan, and grew
out of the efforts of the Lobster Industry Working Group (LIWG).'"
148. Id. § 649.21(a).
149. Id. § 649.21(b)(1). Inshore lobster pots, those generally used in state waters,
weigh between 50 and 60 pounds. EARL L. DOLIBER, LOBSTERING INSHORE AND OFFSHORE
43, (1973). Most lobster fishers fish an average of 250 traps when hauling single traps and
300-400 when using trawls. Trawls are essentially a series of lobster pots strung along a
common line. Offshore pots are often five feet in length, forty-four inches wide, with a
height of eighteen inches. They weigh around 100 pounds. Id. at 63, 65. In addition to the
size differences as compared to inshore traps, offshore traps use twelve inch entry rings (for
lobster entry) as opposed to the five inch rings used in inshore traps. Id. at 65. The use of
trawls is more common in offshore lobstering where between ten and fifty traps, approxi-
mately twenty fathoms apart, are attached to one line that has water surface buoys at each
end. Id. at 66.
150. 50 C.F.R. § 649.21(b)(2) (1996). The regulation specifies the type and
dimensions of the radar reflectors to be used.
151. Id. § 649.21(b)(3).
152. Id. § 649.21(c). Escape vents must either be rectangular with an unobstructed
opening of not less than one and seven-eighths inches by five and three quarters inches or
two circular openings of not less than two and three-eighths inches in diameter. Id §
649.21(c)(i), (ii).
153. Id. § 649.21(e).
154. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AMENDMENT #5 TO THE
AMERICAN LOBSTER FISHERY MANAGEMENTPLAN INCORPORATING AFINALSUPPLEMENTAL
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LIWG was formed by representatives of the U.S. lobster industry, which in
the spring of 1992 began developing a comprehensive statement of manage-
ment principles. 5 The statement was submitted to the Lobster Oversight
Committee as well as to the NEFMC' 56 The NEFMC subsequently
accepted the industry plan as the basis for Amendment Five in January,
1993.157
The LIWG plan, as embodied in Amendment Five, affirmed the
elements of the existing measurement regime, but sought to impose several
additional management measures. Notably, the Amendment Five summary
stated that "[t]he proposed new actions are intended to apply only in the
EEZ.'15 Ironically, the NEFMC also stated that "[fluture complementary
management action may occur in territorial waters through state initiatives
and/or under the auspices of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commis-
sion (ASMFC)."' 5' The NEFMC developed Amendment Five upon the
premise that management should account for the social, cultural, and
economic differences in the various regions across which the lobster fishery
is prosecuted, thus allowing for different management approaches by
area. 1
60
The proposed Amendment Five in part reaffirmed the provisions of
Amendment Four which had been implemented on December 27, 1991.16
Amendment Four established the minimum carapace size of three and
one-quarter inches, rescinded the scheduled size increase, provided a new
definition of overfishing, and formally documented a concern that the
offshore lobster stock was overfished.162 The NMFS approved Amendment
Four, but with the significant proviso that a more comprehensive amend-
ment by submitted by December 27, 199.163 The response to that proviso
ENvIRONMENTAL IMPACTs STATEMENT: Volume I, at 2 (Jan. 24, 1994) [hereinafter
AMENDmENT FIVE].
155. Id. Development of the statement was done with the aid of the University of
New Hampshire Office of Sea GranL
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1. This is unnecessary language because, absent unique circumstances, the
Magnuson Act Lobster FMP had no authority to reach state waters in any event. It is,
indeed, use of the ACFCMA as a management vehicle and the 1996 Magnuson Act
amendments that provide the basis for the cooperative jurisdiction addressed in Part II.C.3.
159. Id.
160. REvIEw, supra note 133, at 3.
161. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 214 (1991).
162. Id. Implementation of these carapace minimum length measures is at 50 C.F.R.
§ 649.20(b)(1) (1996).
163. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 3.
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was proposed Amendment Five.
2. Substantive Provisions of Amendment Five
Under the proposed Amendment Five, the NEFMC planned to imple-
ment a new data collection system which would have included an expanded
weighout system, vessel logbooks, and sea sampling."6 The new data
collection system would have relied on fishery managers and lobster
fishermen alike and would have provided the necessary information for
accurate stock assessment. 65 Specifically, the data would have allowed the
NMFS and the states to "concentrate resources" appropriately to "specific
problems concerning lobster biology, seasonal movements and stock
intermixture, and pre-recruit indices, among others."' 66
Operator permits were also addressed in proposed Amendment Five.
The relevant provision included a requirement that all vessels engaged in
the commercial lobster fishery in the EEZ possess an NMFS-issued
permit.1 67 Vessel operators who were engaged in the commercial fishery
were immediately eligible for a permit, subject to certain requirements
primarily related to the application process. 68 Additionally, the proposed
Amendment stated that a permit was to be non-transferable, and operators
were to have it available at all times for inspection. 69 In addition to lobster
fishing vessel permits, the proposed Amendment addressed dealer permits
as well. A NMFS Lobster Dealer Permit was to have been required of any
dealer of American lobster.
70
Implementation of Amendment Five would also have initiated a
164. AMENDMENT FIvE, supra note 154, at 4. The proposed Amendment noted that
existing data systems implemented by the various states have provided much of the necessary




167. Id. at 13. Permit holders were subject to various permit sanctions for violations
of lobster fishing regulations. "Party and charter boats" engaged in the recreational lobster
fishery in the EEZ were exempted from the permit requirement, provided that no lobster be
bartered or offered for sale, and further that no more than six lobsters per person on board
be landed. Id.
168. Id. at 13-14.
169. Id. at 14.
170. Id. Dealer Permits would be issued for a period from January 1 through
December 31 of each year. Again, these permits were non-transferable and were to be
maintained at the place of business. Dealers, too, could be held accountable for fishing
regulation violations and were subject to permit sanctions. Id.
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moratorium on the issuance of new vessel permits. 7 ' Specifically, no new
vessel permits were to have been issued to vessels that were not already in
possession of a valid Federal lobster permit and actively landing lobsters,
or to vessels or fishermen which were not in possession of a Federally
endorsed state permit and actively landing lobsters.'72 The NEFMC
intended on reviewing the effects of the moratorium during the third year
thereof, to determine whether the intended effects were realized. 73 The
moratorium would have continued for five years from the date of imple-
mentation of Amendment Five, but the Council could have chosen to
extend it for a specified period of time or to terminate it, subject to consis-
tency with the stock-rebuilding program. 74
3. The Stock Rebuilding Program & Effort Management Teams
Central to proposed Amendment Five, and of greatest significance,
was the comprehensive stock-rebuilding program. This provision of the
proposed Amendment is also central to the topic of this Comment, as the
program sought to better recognize the regionalized needs and problems of
the lobster fishery, and attempted to induce cooperation among the various
states and the federally created NEFMC. Proposed Amendment Five would
have created a framework process to institute a lobster stock rebuilding
program in the EEZ with the intent that the several states would introduce
similar measures in state waters. 75 Implementing regulations recognized
four regions: Area 1 was to be the near shore EEZ waters of the Gulf of
Maine; Area 2 would be the near shore EEZ waters of Southern New
England; Area 3 was the offshore waters in the EEZ; and, Area 4 would be
the near shore EEZ waters of the middle Atlantic. 76 This regional ap-
proach to conservation and management was intended to better address the
specific needs of each area and respond to the various environmental and
171. k
172. Id. The specifications stated were subject to various considerations and the
guidelines for the control date specified subsequently in the Amendment provision. Exempt
from the moratorium were recreational boats subject to the same requirements as provided
for operator permits. Id The control date was determined to be March 25, 1992. Id. at 15.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. Upon expiration of the moratorium the Council could authorize the issuance
of new permits subject to any qualifying guidelines the Council determined appropriate. Id.
175. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 3. The stock rebuilding framework regulations were
implemented into the Lobster FMP at 50 C.F.R. § 649.42 (1996).
176. 50 C.F.R. § 649.42(b)(1)-(4) (1996). (setting forth specific latitudinal and
longitudinal points for each area).
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economic forces unique to each region. Tailor-made management pro-
grams for each area would, it was hoped, foster stronger regional support.'"
The stock rebuilding framework also created Effort Management
Teams (EMT).'78 The EMTs were a unique, and somewhat ingenious,
mechanism to ensure regional input into lobster fishery management. An
EMT was created for each of the four regions noted above and charged
with the responsibility of making recommendations for stock rebuilding to
the NEFMC. 179 EMTs were to consist of a common, core group of NMFS,
state, and NMFC representatives "0 in an attempt to encourage action and
compliance by including all interested players in the lobster fishery.
Furthermore, each EMT was required to "consult with lobster fishermen
operating within each Management area.., with the intent of reaching
consensus regarding the specific measures to be applied in each area.''.
A deadline of January 20, 1995 was set for the submission of the EMT
recommendations to the NEFMC. s2 The Council was required to adopt or
modify the recommendations and then submit to the Secretary correspond-
ing management measures in compliance with the Lobster FMP objectives
by July 20, 1995.83 Failure of the NEFMC to meet this deadline would
allow the Secretary of Commerce to determine whether a secretarial
amendment to the FMP was needed. " While the various EMTs submitted
their recommendations by the set deadline, the NEFMC failed to meet the
July 20th deadline due to the unwillingness of state directors from Maine,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut to implement measures in
support of a Council amendment.185 The NMFS had previously indicated
to the NEFMC that its support of an amendment implementing stock
rebuilding measures, such as proposed Amendment Five, was predicated
177. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 3.
178. 50 C.F.R. § 649.42(c).
179. Id. § 649.42(c)(1), (3).
180. AMENDMENT FIVE, supra note 154, at 22.
18 1. Id. at 22-23. Potential measures to be implemented under the framework process
were listed as: a minimum and maximum size limit; trap limits; seasonal closures; closed
areas or zones; restrictions on allowable fishing times; restrictions on allowable catches;
additional gear restrictions; and, "[a]ny other restrictions" necessary for reducing or
controlling lobster mortality rates. Id. at 22-25.
182. 50 C.F.R. § 649.42(c)(3) (1996).
183. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 4. Bear in mind this failure of state officials to compromise on
management and conservation measures that were generally accepted as necessary. This
reality of proprietary state interests stalemating the fishery management process is explored
in more detail, infra.
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on state participation in the administration of the amendment and imple-
mentation of complimentary state programs.'86 The failure of the states to
reach consensus on complimentary programs, and the resulting lack of
support of the NMFS sounded the death knell for Amendment Five.
The failure of Amendment Five is of great significance in most part
due to what it attempted to reach; a system of co-operative management
between the federal agencies, the NEFMC, and the relevant state parties.
Amendment Five would have required the states to rely on the federally
created NEFMC for its directives and for the implementation of local
recommendations, a relationship not without antagonism. Furthermore, a
lack of initiative for agreement and consequences for failure, as between
the states, was reflected in the inability of Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut to adopt measures in support of the NEFMC
Amendment. The model of fishery management based on power centered
with the federal government and siphoned down to a state and local level
had failed for the lobster fishery. It became apparent that a paradigm of
management was necessary wherein the states, holding a vested interest in
the lobster fishery, more directly wielded regulatory and jurisdictional
power.
D. Withdrawal of the Lobster FMP
In the aftermath of the failures under Amendment Five, the NMFS and
Secretary of Commerce determined that the Lobster FMP was not meeting
Magnuson Act objectives of conservation and management. As a result, the
NMFS published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR), dated
September 18, 1995, that discussed two options for action on the Lobster
FMP.1'87 The first option, the one selected and the subject of this Com-
ment, was the withdrawal of the Secretary of Commerce's approval of the
Lobster FMP and its implementing regulations.'88 "The second option,
seemingly never seriously considered, was to prepare a Secretarial amend-
ment to the existing Lobster FMP, in accordance with national standards
and pursuant to the Magnuson Act.'89 Ultimately the environmental
review of the proposed action- assessed three possible alternatives."9 The
186. ME at 3.
187. SeeManagementOptions forthe American LobsterFishery, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,086
(1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 649) (proposed Sept. 18, 1995).
188. Id. at 48,087.
189. l
190. REViEw, supra note 133, at 5.
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Review prefaced discussion of the three alternatives with the stated
objective of "eliminat[ing] Federal regulations that cause unnecessary
duplication and, where possible, to allow state or local governments to
administer programs." '191 A possible Secretarial amendment to the existing
Lobster FMP was discarded as an option. The first alternative was to take
no action and leave the current FMP status quo.' 92 Withdrawal of the
federal Lobster FMP was particularized into two options.
The first withdrawal option was to withdraw approval of the Lobster
FMP with no requirement that regulations promulgated by the ASMFC be
in place.' 93 This option allowed for the possibility that the American
Lobster Fishery in the EEZ would, at least for a time, stand completely
unregulated.
The second, and preferred alternative, was to withdraw the Lobster
FMP and implementing regulations contingent upon the implementation of
a lobster management plan proposed by the ASMFC, pursuant to newly
granted regulatory compliance powers under the ACFCMA." This
alternative was ultimately selected.
Generally, the NMFS cited several reasons for the withdrawal of the
Lobster FMP. As noted above, Presidential regulatory reform provided an
impetus for the action as the NMFS argued that the Lobster FMP and
enforcing regulations could be eliminated without compromising resource
management and conservation objections. NMFS further stated that the
American lobster fishery is primarily prosecuted in state waters, and that
pursuant to recent amendments to the ACFCMA, regulation can now be
achieved under the compliance authority included in that Act.' 96 Further-
more, NMFS asserted that they could no longer ensure that the Magnuson
Act FMP is or can be amended to be consistent with Magnuson Act
national standard one, that requires conservation and management measures
to prevent overfishing. 9 The NMFS concluded the ASMFC is in a better
191. Id. If the content of the quoted language sounds familiar, recall the discussion
of President Clinton's regulatory reform initiative, supra note 2.
192. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 5.
195. American Lobster Fishery; Removal of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,478 (1996)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 649) (proposed Mar. 27, 1996).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 13,479. A compelling issue that remains unaddressed is whether or not
withdrawal of an existing FMP for failure to meet a national standard, rather than amending
the plan to make it consistent, complies with the letter or intent of the Magnuson Act.
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position to address the admittedly overfished conditions of the lobster
stocks unhindered by the NEFMC process 98
According to the NMFS, withdrawal would also ensure consistency
with national standard seven, which requires that conservation and manage-
ment measures minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication where
practicable!" Greater regulatory authority vested in the states under the
ACFCMA was deemed by NMFS to provide a more effective vehicle for
coastal fishery management, and Magnuson Act FMP regulations would
therefore constitute an unnecessary duplication.2" Under ACFCMA, the
NMF continued, the ASMFC could promulgate complimentary Federal
regulations, thereby maintaining effective management of federal water
lobster fisheries."1
NMFS also noted that concurrent withdrawal of Lobster FMP regula-
tions and implementation of the ACFCMA lobster CMP and implementing
regulations would provide a seamless transition.2" The NMFS tempered
its endorsement of the action by noting that, while states would enjoy
greater flexibility in lobster fishery management under the ACFCMA, there
would be no short term decrease in lobster fishing activity or gear deploy-
ment. 3 The NMFS asserted that in the long term, this option would be
more likely to reduce lobster fishing activity due to the ASMFC's ability
to act without the burdens of the regional council process. 204 Nevertheless
the NMFS pointed out that "[tlhere is no guarantee that the ASMFC will
be successful.' 5
Despite the lack of certainty that lobster fishery management under the
ASMFC would be any more effective than future amendments to the
Lobster FMP, the Secretary of Commerce and the NMFS adopted a
position in support of withdrawal of the FMP, based on the reasoning stated
above, and assertions of positive economic and social impact. The Secre-
198. ld.
199. Ld. National standard seven appears in 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(7) (1994).
200. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 4-5.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 8. This assertion seems to presuppose a certain degree of consistency




205. REVIEW, supra note 133, at 8. The NMFS continued to note that while the
decision would not change the current status of the fishery, it may change the federal activity
under which it is being implemented, and that the implementations of regulations under the
ACFCMA might require its own "formal consultation." Id.
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tary published notice of the withdrawal contingent upon implementation of
regulations under the ACFCMA. An amendment to the ACFCMA in the
fall of 1996 has set the stage for the transition of lobster fishery manage-
ment to the ASMFC.2° Under the amendment, if a CMP for the lobster
fishery is not implemented by December 31, 1997, then the Secretary of
Corrmerce must issue interim regulations by March 1, 1998 to regulate the
landing of lobsters in the EEZ.0 7 Specific temporary limits are set forth in
the amendment and the Secretary is required to monitor lobster landings on
a timely basis and if necessary implement other conservation regulations.
28
Thus, the stage has been set for American lobster fishery management to
commence under the ACFCMA.
IV. THE FUTURE OF LOBSTER FISHERY MANAGEMENT -
A PRECARIOUS BALANCE OF POWER
Having explored the legislative enactments allowing for the shift of
management authority to the states as well as the history behind the
decision to withdraw the Magnuson Act FMP, the question remains as to
whether this attempt to cooperatively manage the species will succeed. The
ramifications of the success or failure of state management of the American
Lobster Fishery under the ACFCMA will reach beyond the lobster fishery.
Should this experiment prove successful, its regionalized approach to
fishery management will likely be applied to other fisheries which Council
developed FMPs have failed to adequately conserve.
Regionalized, and even localized, management of fishery resources
holds great promise because it places conservation authority and responsi-
bility in the hands of those closest to the resource. The benefits of doing
so are twofold. First, those who interact daily with the fishery are in a
better position to assess its health and identify those elements causing the
greatest harm. This aspect should assist in the development of appropriate
particularized management efforts. The second benefit is that those closest
to the fishery, who depend upon it for their livelihood and as a stay of local
and state economy, presumably have the most to lose should the fishery
collapse. Ideally, this factor will ensure that necessary conservation
measures will be timely taken and will look to maximize the long term
206. Transition to Management of American Lobster Fishery by Commission, Pub.
L. No. 204-308, § 101(a) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 5107b(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 5107b(a), (b).
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health of the fishery. Despite these seemingly obvious advantages of the
cooperative approach to lobster fishery management under the ACFCMA,
there exists problematic issues arising from the Act's provisions for
cooperative jurisdiction. This section identifies one present and one
potential issue for consideration that may arise under ASMFC management
of the lobster fishery and suggests what impact they may have. Ultimate
resolution of these conflicts, however, will only come with time, and
perhaps litigation.
A. The Balance of Power
Withdrawal of the Lobster FMP has been characterized in this Com-
ment as part of a transition of authority to the states comprising the
ASMFC. While in a general sense, and relative to the split of management
authority under the Magnuson Act, this may be accurate, the division
between state and federal authority as exercised under the ACFCMA is not
so clear-cut. Rather, while the ACFCMA provides the vehicle for greater
state management authority over EEZ waters, it also empowers the federal
government with greater authority over state waters as well.2" It is this
bilateral extension of both state and federal authority that has given rise to
what this Comment has termed cooperative jurisdiction. The balance
struck, at first blush, has great promise; states are given greater ability to
develop appropriate conservation and management efforts over fisheries
which are vital to their economy and way of life, while the federal govern-
ment will play the role of police officer, stepping in only when a state fails
to meets its obligations in implementing a management measures or when
such measures fail to assure effective conservation of the lobster fishery.2"'
The balance struck may prove to be difficult to maintain. Two
particular aspects of this equilibrium are explored below. The first element
to throw the scales off kilter came in the form of the 1996 amendments to
the Magnuson Act. Increased responsibilities on the part of the regional
councils to address overfished species in their geographical regions inhibits
the abdication of fishery management authority absent certainty that
measures are in place to conserve the threatened species. The identification
of the lobster fishery as overfished mandates action on the part of the
NEFMC as the responsible council. A hands-off transfer of management
209. See supra Part lI.C.3 and accompanying notes, addressing the concept of
cooperative management jurisdiction under the ACFCMA.
210. See id.
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authority to the ASMFC no longer appears possible; the NEFMC must
either assure that the ASMFC plan will adequately address the lobster
fishery or the Council must take independent steps. Part IV.A.1 demon-
strates that the NEFMC is attempting to do both and assesses the likely
outcome of this present challenge to ASMFC management of the lobster
fishery. The second potential thumb on the scales that threatens the
delicate balance of power under the ACFCMA is the expanded federal
authority in state waters. Part IV.A.1 examines the Secretary of Com-
merce' s powers in state waters under the ACFCMA and highlights potential
areas of conflict.
1. The Impact of the 1996 Amendments to the Magnuson Act
The first conflict that has arisen in the ASMFC's assumption of control
over the lobster fishery centers on the need for promulgation of compli-
mentary regulations for federal waters. In particular, the 1996 amendments
to the Magnuson Act have dramatically changed the dynamics of regulatory
authority and responsibility between the NEFMC and the ASMFC.
Generally, in order for the states' lobster management plan to effectively
address lobster management and conservation for the entire fishery,
including both across state territorial boundaries as well as beyond the
territorial sea into federal waters, such complimentary regulations must be
promulgated. The ACFCMA does not require the Secretary of Commerce
to implement complimentary regulations, but rather provides that the
Secretary "may implement regulations to govern fishing in the exclusive
economic zone."'.' Furthermore, the decision whether to implement such
regulations can only come after a determination that the regulations are
necessary to support the ACFCMA management plan and that they are
consistent with the Magnuson Act national standards.212 Thus, the Secre-
tary, acting through the NMFS or the NEFMC, is left with a great deal of
discretion regarding whether complimentary regulations will be imple-
mented, and if so what specific measures will be used.213
Indeed, recent events indicate that this aspect of the transition to
ASMFC is providing the most controversy. The 1996 Amendments to the
Magnuson Act, addressed in Part II.B, supra, enacted as the Sustainable
211. 16 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (1994).
212. See supra note 98 for the text of these standards.
213. The ACFCMA provides that federal regulations may include measures
recommended by the ASMFC, and as noted earlier this is likely to be the source for most if
not all regulatory provisions. 16 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (1993).
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Fisheries Act (SFA),214 have placed the NMFS and the ASMFC at a
crossroads. The amendments that have most directly affected the transition
of lobster fishery management are those made to section 1854 of the
Magnuson Act.215 The following explanation of these particular amend-
ments sets the stage for the current challenge to ASMFC management of
the lobster fishery. Under the Amendment, the Secretary is required to
report annually to Congress and the regional Councils on the status of
fisheries within each Council's geographical area of authority.2 6 If a
management plan or international agreement exists for a particular fishery
the criteria included in such plan or agreement shall be used to determine
whether the fishery is overfished.2 7 The amendment continues to state that
if the Secretary determines, "based on trends in fishing effort, fishery
resource size, and other appropriate factors," the fishery will become
overfished within two years then it shall be classified as "approaching a
condition of being overfished."
Upon the determination that a fishery is overfished the Secretary is
required immediately to notify the appropriate Council to request that
action be taken to cease overfishing and to initiate conservation and
28management measures. 18 The following mandate for action on the part of
the designated regional Council is what has created a new tension in the
attempt to transition lobster fishery management to the ASMFC. The
Council, once notified, must prepare a fishery management plan, a plan
amendment, or proposed federal regulations for the identified fishery.219
Such response must "end overfishing in the fishery and.., rebuild affected
stocks of fish;""0 or in the case of a fishery approaching an overfished
condition, prevent future overfishing from occurring."
The Amendment provides further specification for actions proposed to
address an identified fishery. Proposed action must first specify a time
frame for the cessation of overfishing and rebuilding of the fishery, taking
into account the status and biology of the fish stock, the fishing community
needs, recommendations from international organizations, and the interac-
214. Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
215. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
216. Id. § 1854(e)(1).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 1854(e)(2).
219. Id. § 1854(e)(3).
220. Id- § 1854(e)(3)(A).
221. Id. § 1854(e)(3)(B).
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tion of the fishery with the overall marine ecosystem.27 Furthermore, such
time period must not exceed ten years unless particular circumstances such
as the biology of the fish stock or other environmental conditions require
more time.223 Failure by the appropriate Council to submit an appropriate
plan, amendment, or regulations within one year of notification triggers a
requirement that the Secretary take the necessary action. 4 Finally, once
a plan, amendment, or regulations has been implemented, the Secretary
must review the action at routine intervals no longer than two years apart.'
On September 30, 1997 the NMFS issued its first annual list of
overfished fisheries which included the American lobster fishery. 6 Under
the SFA, therefore, the NEFMC, as the responsible council, is compelled
to address the overfished state of the lobster fishery by either preparing a
new lobster FMP or implementing other federal regulations. Ideally, and
consistent with the transition to ASMFC management, the NEFMC would
approve the ASMFC plan and seek federal implementation of its provi-
sions.
The most recent developments in the ASMFC plan are embodied in
Amendment Three to the CMP.227 Amendment Three sets forth not only
particular gear and lobster take requirements, but also specifies throughout
the document the recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce for
complimentary actions for federal waters. 8  The NEFMC, however,
expressed concern over Amendment Three and its ability to address the
overfished condition of the lobster fishery.29 In particular, George Liles,
222. Id. § 1854(e)(4)(A)(i).
223. Id. § 1854(e)(4)(B)(ii).
224. Id. § 1854(e)(5).
225. Id. § 1854(e)(6).
226. American Lobster; Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 62
Fed. Reg. 54,834-02 (1997) [hereinafter Intent to Prepare EIS].
227. ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERY COMMISSION, DRAFT AMENDMENT #3 TO
THE INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR LOBSTER (1997). The Amendment was
produced June 30, 1997, and was the subject of public hearings during August and
September of 1997. Id.
228. Id. § 3.10. Generally, the Commission recommends that the Secretary: (1)
maintain a moratorium on new federal permits; (2) maintain current federal regulations; (3)
require that fishermen comply with state law for landing lobsters in the state where landed,
regardless of where the lobsters were caught; (4) implement any coastal measures included
in the ASMFC plan in federal waters. Further recommendations were currently being sought
by way of public comment at issuance of Amendment Three. Id.
229. See Intent to Prepare EIS, supra note 226, at 54,835; see also Letitia Baldwin,
States, Feds at Odds Over Lobster Crisis Regulators: Plan Inadequate, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11885615; John Richardson, States Rush to Fix
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a National Marine Fisheries spokesman, stated, "[t]he concern is the
proposed traps limits in three years' time would have brought fishing to a
level that is still above the amount of gear that most fishermen have in the
water [today]. ' ' 0
As a result of the NEFMC's concern with the adequacy of the ASMFC
plan and in light of the Council's mandate under the SFA to address the
overfished lobster fishery the NMFS faced a "difficult dilemma."' The
NMFS, therefore, decided it had to move forward with the process of
implementing conservation and management measures for the American
lobster fishery. 1 2 The Service did so despite admitted confusion as to
which was the appropriate regulatory authority to act under, the Magnuson
Act or the ACFCMA. 3 In accordance with the decision to move forward,
the NMFS published a Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on October 22, 1997.' In addition to the measures
included in the ASMFC's Amendment Three, the NMFS considered a
number of its own conservation measures, for example: (1) Effort caps
based on historical trap numbers or a fiat cap, with possible consideration
of areas fished; (2) a trap reduction to 1991 fishing levels; (3) a percent
cap on landings based on total reported landings in previous years, or a flat
cap based on duration of fishing trip; (4) a prohibition on EEZ lobster
taking or possession in the EEZ; (5) applying current federal regulations to
the EEZ via the ACFCMA; or (6) taking no action and maintaining the
status quo." In addition, all of the Amendment Three measures will be
assessed during the EIS process. 3
6
Although the 1996 Amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act clearly
complicated the assumption of lobster fishery management by the ASMFC,
the states were able to develop Amendment Three to address the NMFS's
concerns. With the support of the NMFS, the ASMFC approved Amend-
ment Three on December 12, 1997.' w Because NMFS participated in the
development of the lobster plan, it could not develop its own regulations
until the plan was completed. After the Amendment was approved, NMFS
Lobstering Rules After U.S. Agency Threatens to Do it, PORTLAND PREss HERALD, Oct. 28,
1997, at IA.
230. Baldwin, supra note 230.
231. Intent to Prepare EIS, supra note 226, at 54,835.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 54,834-36.
235. Id. at 54,835-36.
236. Id. at 54,836.
237. 63 Fed. Reg. 10,154-02 (1998).
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began developing regulations under section 804(b) of the ACFCMA."
The SFA's amendment to the ACFCMA, however, required the Secretary
to issue interim regulations by March 1, 1998, if the final regulations had
not been issued under section 804(b) by December 31, 1997. Because its
final regulations had not been issued to meet the December 31 deadline,
NMFS issued an interim rule to implement Congressionally mandated
regulations contained in the SFA on March 2, 1998.239 The interim rule
placed a flat cap on landings in the EEZ based upon the duration of the
fishing trip.2'
Noting that Amendment Three is a "comprehensive plan" for managing
the lobster fishery in state and federal waters, NMFS announced on January
15, 1999, that it was once again proposing to withdraw its approval of the
American Lobster FMP and to remove existing regulations under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.24' NMFS also proposed to implement the mea-
sures already in place under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, as well as imple-
ment new measures under the authority of the ACFCMA.242 Some of the
new measures proposed, consistent with the ASMFC's recommendations
in Amendment Three, include the designation of lobster management areas,
restrictions on fishing gear, and tagging requirements for lobster traps.243
Perhaps even more significant than the regulations themselves is NMFS's
conclusion that implementing regulations under section 804(b) of the
ACFCMA instead of under the Magnuson-Stevens Act "is the best option
to encourage and expedite partnership in state and Federal jurisdicitonal
waters" in order to protect the American Lobster.'4 This strong and
decisive language clearly indicates the willingness of NMFS to rest lobster
management in the hands of the states.
3. Enlarged Federal Authority in State Waters
The second issue that grows from this balance of power inherent in the
cooperative jurisdiction of the ACFCMA pertains to the Secretary of
Commerce's powers. Under the ACFCMA the Secretary has enlarged




241. 64 Fed. Reg. 2708-01 (1999).
242. Id. to be codified at 50 CFR 697.
243. id.
244. Id.
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the Secretary of Commerce authority to take action within state waters
which is likely to raise concerns of state sovereignty. The most significant
power invested in the Secretary is the ability to impose a moratorium on
fishing in the targeted fishery in the waters of a state that is deemed out of
compliance with the ASMFC.24 5 Violation of a moratorium placed on a
fishery in a state's territorial sea may lead to federal civil and/or criminal
penalties.2'
Obviously, the imposition of a moratorium by the federal government
on state waters, at the very least, gives rise to adversarial posturing between
the penalized state and the federal government that is the antithesis of the
cooperative environment that the ACFCMA seeks to promote. Further-
more, it is likely to create tension between the penalized state and the other
ASMFC states that, as is discussed in the following paragraph, must
determine non-compliance. Both levels of animosity would likely inhibit
future development of management and conservation measures.
Additionally, and perhaps more interesting from a legal standpoint, is
the potential implication of the Tenth Amendment. State control over and
responsibility for fishery management in state waters is well established.247
A Secretarial moratorium on state waters arguably is a federal impingement
of state sovereignty and rights as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.248 In a situation where a Secretarial
imposed moratorium were to take place pursuant to the lobster management
plan developed by the ASMFC, it is probable, absent quick remedial efforts
by the state, that such a moratorium would be challenged on Tenth Amend-
ment grounds. Congress has historically been able to exercise broad
regulatory power over fishery management pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, which would weigh in favor of constitutionality.
Furthermore, coupling Commerce Clause power with the contingent
nature of the Secretarial authority under the ACFCMA provides greater
support for the Act in the face of a Tenth Amendment challenge. The
Secretary exercises the authority to impose the moratorium, but only upon
the finding of state non-compliance by the Commission.249 The Secretary
245. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(c) (1994). See also supraPartII.C.3 and accompanying notes.
246. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(f). The ACFCMA incorporates the civil and criminal penalties
set forth in the Magnuson Act. Il §§ 1858 & 1859.
247. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
248. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
249. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5105, 5106 (1994).
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of Commerce does not determine whether or not a state has failed to
implement an ASMFC management plan, this is done by the Commission.
Thus, ASMFC states monitor the efforts of partner states and report
non-compliance to the Secretary in order to seek responsive action." Only
after receiving notification from the Commission can the Secretary review
the determination of non-compliance"1 and then impose a moratorium if
necessary."2 Finally, the states, acting through the Commission, can
withdraw the determination of non-compliance upon finding that the
offending state has taken remedial measures, and notify the Secretary of
such withdrawal. z 3 While the punitive measures are indeed imposed by the
federal government, via the Secretary of Commerce, the ability to do so is
contingent upon action by the Commission, comprising fellow states
entered into under a voluntary inter-state compact. While not dispositive
of the constitutional issue of the Tenth Amendment, it certainly would
impact a court's analysis of the issue.
Analysis of the Tenth Amendment implications in the ACFCMA could
constitute a complete article in and of itself and is well beyond the scope
of this Comment. 4 It suffices, for purposes of this Comment, to identify
the issue and acknowledge it is a constitutional challenge likely to be
resolved only in a court of law. Certainly, should the matter arise in the
context of litigation, the outcome will have a profound effect on future
attempts for state and federal cooperative jurisdiction in fishery manage-
ment and conservation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Withdrawal of the Magnuson Act Lobster FMP in favor of state
management under the ACFCMA is a fascinating and important situation
in fishery management. The historical background illuminates the failures
of the Magnuson Act regional council management system as well as the
various entities that have a significant interest in the lobster fishery
specifically and fishery management in general. The shift in management
authority is important in that if it proves successful it will serve as a
250. Id. § 5105(b).
251. Id. § 5106(a).
252. Id. § 5106(c).
253. Id. § 5105(c).
254. For a recent United States Supreme Court analysis of the Tenth Amendment
issue and guidance as to how the ACFCMA might be construed, see New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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paradigm for future fishery management efforts. If unsuccessful, many
more questions will arise as to what methods are necessary for conservation
of America's fisheries.
While ASMFC management of the American Lobster fishery has been
repeatedly characterized as a transition to state management, this Comment
demonstrates that it is a more complicated proposition. Fishery manage-
ment under the ACFCMA is actually a result of cooperative jurisdiction,
where the traditional strict separation of federal and state jurisdiction is
blurred and both powers extend into one another to some degree. It is this
overlap of authority that perhaps will provide a system of checks and
balances sufficient to ensure that not only are conservation and manage-
ment measures developed and implemented, but are also adhered to. In the
final analysis, however, success would do much more than serve to validate
a philosophical or political approach to fishery management, it will save the
American Lobster.
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